I would love to counter argue but most of the terms you connect strike me as gibberish. Possibly if I were really deep into whatever philosophy you are cribbing, I would vaguely understand it.
"But modern materialism cannot account for such subjective experiences because it defines matter in objective, quantitative terms, while the phenom…
I would love to counter argue but most of the terms you connect strike me as gibberish. Possibly if I were really deep into whatever philosophy you are cribbing, I would vaguely understand it.
"But modern materialism cannot account for such subjective experiences because it defines matter in objective, quantitative terms, while the phenomenological character that we associate with say, the experience of the redness of the rose we see, or its fragrance, is relegated to the mind"
I'd say this paragraph appears to be begging the question (in the correct sense of that phrase) You are just saying that the material components of the mind cannot account for subjective experiences because (large number of words)...only the mind can do that.
Maybe, maybe not.
But your assertion that materialism defines matter as objective and therefore it cannot account for subjective experience is just word play. Some materialist used the word objective therefore nothing subjective can be accounted for? Huh?
I kind of get it. It's saying something to the effect of, material is all the same and obeys rules deterministically so how can something unique or subject ever happen or be experienced.
All I can say to that is maybe, but large complex systems have emergent properties and large language models show that we have poor instinct and understand of what happens at scale. Dismissing it as magic shows lack of experience with that phenomenon or purposeful closed mindedness.
It's not begging the question because this how *materialists* define matter, not I. I do not agree with the materialist definition of matter, and I am quite happy to assimilate consciousness and associated phenomena such as qualia and intentionality (though not rationality) to a richer conception of matter that can accommodate such things.
Cartesians are the ones who defined matter to be objective and capable of being captured completely in scientific terms: this necessitated relegating all such things that could not be so captured, such as subjective experiences, to the mind, which they were explicit about. Modern materialists have inherited and accepted this conception of matter, but have now tried to redefine mind in the same materialist terms. But given this definition of matter, this is simply not possible, as the earlier Cartesians recognized: If you've defined matter to exclude qualitative features, then trying to explain subjective experiences in completely material terms is the one thing you cannot do.
I suggest Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" or Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary's Room.
I would love to counter argue but most of the terms you connect strike me as gibberish. Possibly if I were really deep into whatever philosophy you are cribbing, I would vaguely understand it.
"But modern materialism cannot account for such subjective experiences because it defines matter in objective, quantitative terms, while the phenomenological character that we associate with say, the experience of the redness of the rose we see, or its fragrance, is relegated to the mind"
I'd say this paragraph appears to be begging the question (in the correct sense of that phrase) You are just saying that the material components of the mind cannot account for subjective experiences because (large number of words)...only the mind can do that.
Maybe, maybe not.
But your assertion that materialism defines matter as objective and therefore it cannot account for subjective experience is just word play. Some materialist used the word objective therefore nothing subjective can be accounted for? Huh?
I kind of get it. It's saying something to the effect of, material is all the same and obeys rules deterministically so how can something unique or subject ever happen or be experienced.
All I can say to that is maybe, but large complex systems have emergent properties and large language models show that we have poor instinct and understand of what happens at scale. Dismissing it as magic shows lack of experience with that phenomenon or purposeful closed mindedness.
It's not begging the question because this how *materialists* define matter, not I. I do not agree with the materialist definition of matter, and I am quite happy to assimilate consciousness and associated phenomena such as qualia and intentionality (though not rationality) to a richer conception of matter that can accommodate such things.
Cartesians are the ones who defined matter to be objective and capable of being captured completely in scientific terms: this necessitated relegating all such things that could not be so captured, such as subjective experiences, to the mind, which they were explicit about. Modern materialists have inherited and accepted this conception of matter, but have now tried to redefine mind in the same materialist terms. But given this definition of matter, this is simply not possible, as the earlier Cartesians recognized: If you've defined matter to exclude qualitative features, then trying to explain subjective experiences in completely material terms is the one thing you cannot do.
I suggest Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" or Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary's Room.